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Abstract. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Spanish fascism developed its own repressive tools 
and resources against their enemies (Republicans, Socialists, Communists and Anarchists among others) in 
the same way other European fascisms did. The depth of the Spanish nationalism brought Franco’s repression 
against the Catalan society to the height of the processes of cultural and linguistic persecution in the same 
way that Nazism or Italian fascism had done in the territories they occupied during the years of World War II. 
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« By shaping the term “genocide” Lemkin was posing a challenge to Historians »1 
Y. Ternon 
1 What Paul Preston reminded us of: genocide as a form of Francoist 
repression. 
In 2011, Paul Preston’s book The Spanish Holocaust. Hate and extermination during the Spanish Civil war and 
afterwards (published also in Catalan and in Spanish)2 awoke the old ghosts of the nominal debates, full-blown 
qualifications (or disqualifications), and the quantitative and qualitative hierarchies of the repressive processes 
of the Franco regime. Could terms like "holocaust" be used without taking any harm? Was it not a grueling 
                                                            
* Francesc Vilanova i Vila-Abadal is Professor and Head of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History at the 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His research includes the Catalan exile of 1939, the political and intellectual history of 
the first Francoist postwar, the Francoist repression and the impact of World War II on Catalan society. 
 
1. «Al forjar el término “genocidio”, Lemkin lanzaba un desafio a los historiadores.» (Ternon, 1995: 59) 
2. In its Catalan edition L’holocaust espanyol. Odi i extermini durant la Guerra Civil i després, Base (2011).  
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exaggeration, fueled only by publishing interests? Had not Paul Preston exaggerated the note, considering his 
leftist tendencies? 
Beyond the arguments and discussions on Preston’s work —and its title—, to which I will refer further on, the 
controversy was not new in Catalonia. It felt like the visit of an old acquaintance whom you have not seen for a 
long time. The starting point of the identification of the repression/genocide concept in the Catalan territories 
can be placed in 1973, when Josep Benet published, in Paris, the book Catalunya sota el règim franquista. 
Informe sobre la persecució de la llengua i la cultura de Catalunya pel règim del general Franco (1a. part).3 In 
the Parisian edition’s preface (which dates from January 1972, «XXXII Barcelona’s occupation Anniversary by 
Franco’s armies»), Josep Benet showed his cards:  
The persecution against the Catalan language and culture was the inevitable fulfillment of one of the 
essential goals of the Francoist regime, the victor of the Spanish Civil War: the extinction of Catalonia 
as a minority nation within the Spanish State by destroying its linguistic and cultural identity, and the 
reduction of its language to a “patois” condition. In short: the main goal was to erase Catalan’s specific 
personality and to colonize Catalonia in a linguistic, political, cultural and economic way. (Benet, 1972: 
10)  
Having confirmed their intentions and updated their program which they defined as the «inevitable fulfillment of 
one of the essential goals», Benet also made a second consideration which, oddly enough, has gone unnoticed:  
The persecution of the Francoist regime against Catalan culture and language, during the first years of 
the Spanish post-war era, took place at the same time as the fierce repression the Francoism unleashed 
against those defeated in the conflict. This repression spread all across the Spanish territory by way of 
hundreds of thousands of executions, hundreds of thousands of prisoners and political exiles and by a 
severe undermining of the essential human rights. (Benet, 1972: 10-11) 
Although the text was not quite clear, Benet suggested two fundamental issues: (i) the persecution against the 
language and the culture of the Catalans and (ii) the link between Catalan repression and the general violence 
enforced by the Francoist regime across Spain. It is important to emphasize this double aspect because one of the 
most common criticisms addressed to Josep Benet is that he took a sectorial and territorial repression (cultural 
and linguistic) for a cultural genocide, which was deemed to be a quite different issue. 
However, the core of the «Benetian» thesis appeared further on: 
We believe that our studies on the persecution against the Catalan language and culture prove that the 
Francoist State was responsible for an attempt of cultural genocide. It is true that the concept of cultural 
genocide was not included in the final text of the Convention for prevention and repression of genocide 
crimes of December 9th 1948. [...] However —and despite its exclusion— this concept unfortunately 
reflects a number of realities that are not only predictable but existed and continue to exist nowadays. 
(Benet, 1972: 11)4  
The ambiguity of the situation was as follows: Josep Benet was dealing with an idea –«cultural genocide»-, 
which had been accepted in the final statement of United Nations, but was not recognized by the legal and 
international documents that followed, in spite of a complementary proposal suggested by the USSR and 
                                                            
3. Catalonia under Francoism regime. Report on the Catalan language and culture persecution by the General Franco 
regime (1st part) Edicions Catalanes de París. As it is well known, the book was distributed secretly inside the country. In 
1978, Editorial Blume had republished the book in Barcelona. The success was prominent because two more reprints were 
published in 1978 and 1979. In 1995, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat published the final edition, under a long time 
expected title: L’intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya (The Francoist attempt at cultural genocide against 
Catalonia). 
4. «L’estudi que presentem sobre la persecució contra la llengua i la cultura a Catalunya creiem que prova que l’Estat 
franquista és responsable d’un intent de genocidi cultural. És cert que el concepte de genocidi cultural no es troba previst en 
el text definitiu de la Convenció per a la prevenció i repressió del crim de genocidi del 9 de desembre de 1948. [...] Però, 
tanmateix, malgrat l’exclusió del concepte de genocidi cultural d’aquesta Convenció, aquest concepte, dissortadament, 
respon a unes realitats no sols previsibles, sinó que han existit i continuen existint en el món actual.» 
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rejected by Western countries.5 This proposal contained the idea that «genocide is any deliberate action carried 
out to destroy the language, the religion or the culture of a national, racial or religious group…» (Benet, 1972: 
11). Genocidal practices could be summarized into two areas. The first one would be to forbid the use of the 
language in daily relations, to prohibit teaching the language at schools and to publish and distribute articles and 
books written in this language. The second one would be the destruction or rejection of the language in 
«libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, religious places or other institutions and cultural venues» 
(Benet, 1972: 11).  
Following the Soviet proposal, Josep Benet had no doubt that «the persecution case against Catalan language 
and culture is clearly included into this definition of cultural genocide, and almost every description that 
contains has been carried out in Catalonia by General Franco’s regime.» (Benet, 1972: 12). He concluded:  
Given the severity of cultural genocide, one would expect the United Nations to include it among the 
cases that the Convention contemplates. It is imperative for the protection of Human Rights and for the 
rights of nations, as well as for the protection of Humanity’s cultural heritage.6  
Josep Benet was partially right in his claim of considering this concept, even if it had not been incorporated into 
the official legal texts. According to a normative-nominalist point of view, a «cultural genocide» never took 
place in Spain. Denial of the cultural genocide became the official version of what happened in Catalonia since 
1939, according to the parameters designed by Raphael Lemkin which were incorporated in the project’s 
resolution but dismissed by the United Nations Commission —the sole responsible for the final text.7 
As years passed, Josep Benet’s book and concept of «cultural genocide» became part of the canon of Catalan 
historical literature on the first Francoism and post-war repression. Nevertheless, Spanish historical research in 
general, and a good part of Catalan research addressed to Spanish Civil War studies, Francoism, repression and 
political violence, clearly ignored or criticized Josep Benet’s book. Especially since 1995, when the title of the 
new edition included the word ‘genocide’. The central and concurrent argument was that the title was mainly 
showing a nationalist point of view —i.e., biased and partial—, with an incorrect and abusive use of the concept, 
which was in fact created and designed to define other historical realities.8 
The situation became more complicated when Josep Benet —along with other historians who followed his 
interpretation— did not clarify an important misunderstanding: they were using a descriptive category, «cultural 
genocide», which was not codified and, because of that, did not have a recognized regulatory paradigm 
according to the international legal canon. It is worth mentioning that it was a helpful tool to define a historical 
process, not a legal or criminal one. Thus, by using this concept no one was expecting an international 
condemnatory answer against the criminals —in this case the Spanish fascist regime. It is important to point this 
out because most of the criticisms and disqualifications Josep Benet and his followers received relied on self-
interested misunderstandings: the Catalan historian invented a criminal, nonexistent qualification, for his own 
sake to define a specific historical situation. In other words, how could we ever qualify as «cultural genocide» 
                                                            
5 This has changed in recent times, as international lawyers, legal scholars, and international institutions are seriously taking 
into account the concept of «cultural genocide». For a recent update, see Novic (2016).   
6. «Hom té dret a esperar que l’organització de les Nacions Unides, davant la gravetat del crim que representa el genocidi 
cultural, es decidirà a incloure aquest crim entre els casos previstos en l’esmentada Convenció contra el genocidi. Així ho 
reclama la salvaguarda dels drets de la persona humana i dels pobles i, també, la del patrimoni cultural de tota la 
humanitat». 
7. For a summary on the exclusion proceeding of the term «cultural genocide» and the United Nations discussions, see Gil 
(1999: 166-168). 
8. Without mentioning Benet’s book as a source (he would do it further on, as we will see), and in a more updated point of 
view of the debate, Professor Jorge Marco did not refrain himself in showing his own satisfaction to be able to invoke 
Christian Gerlach, the Swiss historian (one of the best experts in the so-defined «genocide studies») which, «en su más 
reciente trabajo ofrece diversos argumentos para renunciar al concepto de genocidio, pero atendiendo a la cuestión de los 
usos públicos señala uno de vital importancia: la mayor parte de los “genocides scholars” han asumido las narrativas 
nacionalistas, cuyo discurso utiliza el concepto de genocidio – gracias a la cada vez mayor etnicización de la historia – para 
construir y reforzar sus identidades nacionales» (aforementioned Marco, J. 2012: 339). In any case, Jorge Marco’s 
interpretation of Gerlach’s words seems a little bit exaggerated; at least, this is what can be deduced from reading Gerlach 
and Luna (2010), in which Christian Gerlach’s explanations on “ethnicity [sic] of history” seems somewhat confusing. See 
also the critical review by H. Travis on Gerlach’s book at Journal of Genocide Studies (2012).  
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some minor repressive episodes? It is remarkable how Spanish historical research —and some of the Catalan 
research as well— have had the tendency to minimize this aspect of the Francoist repressive system, arguing that 
this category had not been incorporated into the legal texts, that is to say, into the international conventions to 
prevent genocides.  
On the other side, the fact remains that the term “genocide” has become chronic in a variety of Catalan texts —
not only those related to History (mainly in the fields of political essay, journalism, etc.). It has also reached a 
place in Spanish historical research, in which the concept itself has been distorted and, of course, abused.9 With 
this consideration in mind, one can be tempted to say that it is a bad practice of Catalan nationalist historical 
research —thus agreeing with Christian Gerlach and his peculiar idea of «the ever-growing etnicization of 
History»—, which would allow to dismiss any further discussion that could take us deeper into a more 
interesting and scientific debate. 
Nationalist simplifications sometimes neglect certain aspects of Franco’s era, and makes them impossible to be 
discussed. What would Christian Gerlach and Professor Jorge Marco say when someone as unsuspicious of 
being a Catalan nationalist as Josep M. Castellet describes what he experienced in 1939? He clearly stated that 
that they were experiencing «annihilation» and «cultural genocide»: 
The cultural repression was much worse than what the most pessimistic could have ever thought. Not 
only were political responsibilities persecuted, but also an entire plan, very well prepared, was executed 
with the solely aim of destroying everything that had been politically and culturally built in the 
previous years. None of it could survive, precisely because the annihilation plan was so well organized. 
(Castellet, 1983: 82)10 
 Then he added:  
Someday we shall find amongst the Francoist files —if they had not been destroyed—the briefings and 
reports of what became a true cultural genocide. It seems obvious that in the drafting process, there 
were not only fascist politicians who contributed to its creation but also people coming from the 
intellectual world of the enemy faction. (Castellet, 1983: 82)11  
Josep M. Castellet was not wrong. Catalan Phalangists, the «camisas viejas» as well as newcomers from the new 
weekly newspaper Destino. Política de Unidad, made clear that besides the «annihilation» issue: 
Concurrently with Catalonia’s physical occupation, it will also be necessary to conduct a sort of moral 
occupation. This moral occupation is, in fact, most urgent since it requires not only the kindling of a 
specific political inclination but also —especially— the uprooting of the existing one. («La Falange», 
Destino. Política de Unidad, 97; 8th January 1939)12  
The «political awareness» to be absolutely destroyed mentioned in the text is the Catalan political/cultural 
identity. To “uproot” or to “eradicate” means to annihilate as well, as pointed out by Josep M. Castellet.  
The Professor of Linguistics and Philology, Jordi Castellanos, extended the scope beyond a strictly academic 
approach by defining «a genocide attempt» (Castellanos, 2013 [1995]). He added other factors besides the 
repressive one alone: «the defeat of the war and the experience of being in exile». The sort of phenomenon that 
                                                            
9. One of the many rand criticism ramifications of the Benetian thesis can be found in a historic-political combat essay by 
Ferrer Gironès, 1985, in which “cultural genocide” is taken a step further to “Catalan holocaust”. 
10. «La repressió cultural va ser molt més forta que no pas havien pensat els més pessimistes. Perquè no es buscaren, 
solament, responsabilitats polítiques, sinó que es posà en marxa un pla, molt ben preparat, d’anorreament de tot el que 
havia estat construït, políticament i culturalment, en els anys precedents. No es va poder salvar res, precisament perquè la 
planificació de l’aniquilament estava curosament pensada»  
11. «Algun dia es trobaran, en els arxius franquistes —si no és que els hagin destruït—, els informes més o menys 
programats, del que va esdevenir un autèntic genocidi cultural. És evident que, en la seva redacció, no hi van intervenir 
només els polítics feixistes, sinó gent procedent del món intel·lectual de la facció enemiga» 
12. «Paralela a la ocupación física de Cataluña, cabrá, pues fundamentalmente, una manera de ocupación moral. Ocupación 
moral que apremia tanto más, cuanto que se trata no sólo de crear una conciencia política determinada, sino 
primordialmente, de desarraigar otra». 
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would help to destroy the structure of the Catalan society by leaving it parentless, without «leaders, politicians or 
intellectuals»; a very similar image, as we shall see, to the one portrayed by Raphael Lemkin in his texts. 
The sociologist and publisher Francesc Vallverdú referred to «L’intent de genocidi lingüístic» [The attempt at 
linguistic genocide] (Gabriel, 1998: 75 and ff.), an odd perspective for a conspicuous text that did not contain 
enough data to justify such a severe assertion. However, his work reminded the prohibitive measures of 
dictatorship, and the setback of the social use of Catalan, not only at the (forbidden) public level, but also in the 
private domain. This setback related to the regime’s most supportive social sectors and families, who «freely» 
switched from Catalan to Spanish, because Spanish could be identified more easily with Fascism and the victors 
of the war. Language ended up becoming a matter of social status and/or, merely, an opportunity to thrive in the 
new situation.13  
Ten years later, after Josep Benet’s book was republished with a new tittle L’intent franquista de genocidi 
cultural contra Catalunya, the term and its descriptive capacity remained very active among historians. It looked 
like Catalonia was experiencing, once again, a very interesting battle where opinions about the nature of 
Franco’s repression faced the ignorance of peninsular historical studies, strictly ideologically and Spanish--
centered.   
The return of «cultural genocide» to historical analysis about Francoism, beyond its use in the media, came back 
with the work and the group led by Josep M. Solé i Sabaté. Professor Solé assembled the four volumes of El 
franquisme a Catalunya [Francoism in Catalonia], published at Edicions 62 between 2005 and 2007. Josep M. 
Solé Sabaté wrote in the Introduction to the first volume (The totalitarian dictatorship, 1939-1945):  
The Francoist dictatorship wished to eliminate Catalonia as a people and as an identity, as a culture and 
as a reality, in an unsuccessful attempt of cultural genocide that nevertheless, it has to be said, found 
Catalan collaborationists…14  
The fundamental thesis —and the way of expressing it— leads to the influence exerted by Josep Benet’s work 
about an important area of Catalan historical research. The transmission of this Benetian interpretation becomes 
also visible in the historian David Tormo’s introduction to the same first volume. He entitled his statement on 
cultural and linguistic repression «Genocidi cultural i lingüístic. La imposició d’una cultura espanyolitzadora i 
uniformista» [Cultural and linguistic genocide. The imposition of a Spanishizing and uniformizing culture] 
(Tormo, 2007: 162-175). This work consisted of a thorough compilation of the most important legal rules and 
regulations aimed at implementing the prohibition of the use of the Catalan language in the public domain, 
completed with some examples of the Spanish cultural imposition in the country. His text is very interesting —
especially the effort he makes in the summary— although he does not explain what is, according to him, the link 
between «cultural genocide» and Francoist repression. Implicitly, the reader can conclude that the amount of 
coercive measures was enough to justify the use of the expression.  
Nevertheless, the reappearance of the term in this publication did not trigger any significant discussion nor any 
controversy. The Benetian terminology has been incorporated into Catalan historical research on Francoism 
carried out by historians, philologists and cultural historian with greater or lesser intensity, and with more or less 
critical approach. The term “repression” has been overlooked in other cultural or linguistic approaches. Spanish 
historical research publications and studies have apparently lost interest in Catalan scientific production in the 
past few years —in the historical one, at the very least. 
Not surprisingly, Spain had to wait for a historian from the Spanish periphery, Borja de Riquer, to adopt the term 
«cultural genocide». Riquer explained the way this genocide was put into practice within the general frame of 
                                                            
13. Esther Tusquets’ testimony regarding this aspect is fair enough: «Mis padres, que siempre habían hablado conmigo en 
catalán, utilizaron con mi hermano, nacido tras la guerra, el castellano […], que era, por una parte, el idioma de la gran 
pijería aristocrática y alto burguesa, y, por otra, el que utilizábamos con el servicio procedentes casi siempre de otras partes 
de España». (Tusquets, 2007: 24-25) 
14. «la dictadura franquista va voler fer desaparèixer Catalunya com a poble i com a identitat pròpia, com a cultura i com a 
realitat específica en un fracassat intent de genocidi cultural però que, tot s’ha de dir, va trobar col·laboracionistes 
catalans...» (Solé, 2005-2007: 12). 
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repression, and how it related to the Francoist nature itself (Riquer, 2010). According to him, the first step to 
implement the genocide was in fact extremely easy: in addition to the dictatorship’s fascist nature —or the will 
to turn others into fascists—, the Francoist regime was inherently and genetically nationalistic. Within this 
framework, Catholics and fundamentalists, monarchical supporters, the army, Carlists and Phalangists —or in 
some cases merely fascists—, could argue and confront each other within the rules and limits established by the 
Dictatorship and the Dictator. Despite their differences, all of them shared a common element: they represented 
«the most aggressive and unionist inclinations of Spanish nationalism» (Riquer, 2010: 20). To round up his 
explanation, Borja de Riquer added:  
Even though both nationalist projects [the ultra-Catholic one and the Phalangist one, for short] were 
quite antagonistic and they had many passionate confrontations during Franco’s dictatorship, they also 
showed significant ideological overlapping. Thus they agreed on the need of a “Spanish re-
nationalization” and on the importance of fighting off the left-wing influences from the different 
nationalisms, especially the Catalan and Basque ones. (Riquer, 2010: 21).15 
Indeed, the so-called historical nations (Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia) became the main targets of the 
new/old Spanish nationalist program, which shared and contaminated the speeches of the rebels:  
One of the main obsessions of the new regime’s authorities was to eliminate every single non-Spanish 
sign of identity, and one of the main priorities was to make the populations that shared separatist 
ideologies Spanish. Their aim was to cut out the entire constitutive values of the nationalist movements 
and their Catalan, Basque and Galician identities, as well as in other regionalist territories. Franco’s 
Spanish nationalist project aimed at “overcoming” the existing differences within the Spanish, Catalan, 
Basque and Galician social bodies.  For that reason, the Spanish national unity inevitably led to a total 
Unitarianism. It was necessary to overcome class struggle, to abolish all separatist movements, to 
forbid every political party and every trade union, and to block any dissemination of democratic and 
revolutionary ideas. To erase every single aspect of heterogeneity: political, ideological, or cultural 
identity. (Riquer, 2010: 21)16  
From this point of view, cultural and linguistic repression of a particular territory, for example Catalonia, 
became another ring in the complex political, social, economic and nationalizing (or renationalizing) repressive 
system; much in the same way of what was being done in European territories under fascist and Nazi 
occupations.17 After describing the repressive measures effectively implemented18, he concluded:  
The repressive policy against Catalan identity, not only against political Catalanism, can be considered 
an aggression toward a community, toward an identity, and this idea is also applicable to the repression 
                                                            
15. «Aunque ambos proyectos nacionalistas eran bastante antagónicos, y se enfrentaron con pasión durante toda la dictadura 
de Franco, también había importantes coincidencias e incluso aspectos complementarios. Coincidían así, en la necesidad de 
“re-nacionalizar España” y de combatir las influencias dejadas por los nacionalismos alternativos, especialmente el catalán 
y el vasco.»  
16. «Una de las mayores obsesiones de las autoridades del nueva regimen fue la eliminación de todo signo de identidad 
diferente del español, por lo que una de las principales prioridades sería la españolización de la población de los territories 
influidos por las ideas separatistas. Se aspiraba a extirpar totalmente los valores constitutivos de los movimientos y las 
identidades nacionalistas catalana, vasca y gallega, así como de los regionalismos. El proyecto nacionalista español del 
franquismo aspiraba a “superar” las divisiones y diversidades existentes en el cuerpo social. Por ello, la defensa de la 
unidad nacional española conducía inevitablemente a un unitarismo total. Era preciso superar la lucha de clases, abolir los 
separatismos, prohibir los partidos políticos y los sindicatos, e impedir la difusión de las ideas democráticas y 
revolucionarias. Es decir, borrar todo rasgo de heterogeneidad política, ideológica, identitaria o cultural. » 
17. The term  ‘renacionalization’  allows us to embrace both denationalization and nationalization processes carried out by the 
fascisms on the conquered territories —the ones they think that they do not completely belong to the main fascist-land 
(Germany, Italy, Spain). Alsace and Slovenia would be almost alien territories from the central Nation (Germany, Italy). 
Catalonia would be partially part of this central Nation, especially if we are aware of the Spanish nationalist (in other words 
Francoist and Phalangist) point of view. According to this self-explanation of Spain, Catalonia was deemed to be Spanish 
before the Roman empire (as it can be found in the works by José M. Pemán or Pedro Font Puig, for example), and was 
kidnapped by an anti-Spanish minority during the second half of the 19th  century at the same time that Catalans experienced 
a cultural rebirth, and Spain went deeply into the crisis at the end of the century. 
18 Prohibition of Catalan language in the public domain, the administration and education at all levels; its disappearance from 
the media, from publishers;  the purge and executions of persons of the cultural sphere; the Hispanicization not only of 
people’s names, but also of country toponymy (villages, cities, rivers, mountains) and commercial companies and brands, 
etc.  
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against the Basque and Galician identities. Some historians have qualified this policy of repression as 
an open attempt at cultural genocide. This statement sounds very blunt, but I think we should keep in 
mind Javier Tussell’s observation: “those who fought against Franco and were not Catalan or Basque, 
and those who considered themselves the true victims of the repression of the post-war era, should 
remember that there was a heavier punishment that was not inflicted upon them: the inability of using 
one’s own language”. Those facts well deserve the name “cultural genocide”.  (Riquer, 2010: 168)19 20 
When Paul Preston published El Holocausto español (2011) one year later the discussion in Spain was suddenly 
poisoned. In Hispanic terms, the discussion referred mainly to the use of the term Holocaust in the tittle of the 
book, while the subtitle, Odio y exterminio (Hate and extermination), went unnoticed. In the prologue, 
paradoxically, the author justified the use of an expression that had been reserved to date to qualify the Jewish 
extermination by the Nazis. He defended his point of view by putting at the same level the numbers and degree 
of the Francoist repression. Further down, he wrote about «the extermination of the left», the «procedures of 
horror and extermination», «the extermination that targeted rebels», etc. Actually, there was no need to be 
shocked by this kind of vocabulary. One may remember José M. Pemán —who happily died as a respected 
liberal monarchic supporter— writing in 1937: «The war, with its trifle light, has helped us open our eyes. The 
idea of turn or political game has been replaced forever by the idea of extermination and expulsion»21. It was 
common mentioning the war and the Francoist repression in these terms.     
Beyond the general discussion triggered by the book, its title and its contents,  parts of the debate evidenced the 
lethal combination of Neo-Francoist historical research, ignorance and ideological prejudices.22 Pedro Carlos 
González Cuevas, for instance, became an implacable prosecutor of Paul Preston’s theories. A statement that 
ignited a new debate on the subject has caught our attention (González Cuevas, 2011a: 154). Almost at the end 
of the review, Pedro Carlos González Cueva writes: 
Finally, Preston tends to emphasize the "almost racist" hatred of the Francoists towards Catalonia. Were 
not there Catalans in the ranks of the National Army? Undoubtedly, the prohibition of the Catalan 
language in public places was both a political and historical mistake; Of course the prohibition of 
Catalan in public places was a mistake both from a political and a historical perspective; but from that 
to describe what happened as an extermination of Catalan population because of their self-identity is 
disproportionate at best. Therefore, we can ask ourselves if that hatred was so strong and intense, why 
                                                            
19. «Pero la política franquista con respecto a la catalanidad, y no solo al catalanismo político, bien puede considerarse 
como una agresión, a una comunidad, a una identidad, y eso también puede aplicarse a los casos de las identidades vasca y 
gallega. Algunos historiadores han calificado esta política franquista de claro intento de genocidio cultural. La frase puede 
parecer muy contundente, pero pienso que debe retenerse el razonamiento de Javier Tusell: “los militantes antifranquistas 
no catalanes o vascos, que consideran que ellos mismos sufrieron el ápice de la represión de la posguerra, debieran tener en 
cuento existió una pena que ellos no padecieron, la imposibilidad de utilizar la propia lengua. Lo que produjo entonces bien 
merece ser designado como genocidio cultural”. » 
20. Regarding these synthetic works, for instance the one from Borja de Riquer, it is a bit disturbing that, in the book 
dedicated to culture and society during the Dictatorship (Gracia Garcia y Ruiz Carnec, 2001) —a similar compilation as the 
one from Marcial Pons-Crítica (the same publishing company in charge of the previous Borja de Riquer’s book)— there are 
no comments nor mentions of the cultural and linguistic repression, either in Catalonia, the Basque Country nor Galicia. The 
closest to some kind of deliberation on this matter appears within a generic paragraph, in which the most important thing is to 
talk about the adjective «fascist»: «Franco’s regime behaves as a fascist regime. The regime was trying to implement a 
certain political culture among citizens that was able to allow war vanquishers to remain and keep the power. As for the 
Italian case, and the German, a new cultural official discourse was instituted in a wider sense, but as if it was coming from 
their own population» (Gracia y Ruiz 2001: 69); «el régimen de Franco se comporta como un régimen fascista. Lo que el 
régimen pretendía era implantar una determinada cultura política entre los ciudadanos que permitiera la continuidad en el 
poder de los vencedores de la Guerra. Tanto en el caso italiano como alemán, se intenta imponer un nuevo discurso cultural 
en el sentido más amplio, pero identificando como algo procedente de la población» (Gracia y Ruiz, 2001: 69) And the 
icing on the cake : we realize that «la poderosa presión política de la cultura del régimen» had a «expresión castellana y 
antinacionalista de intención política» (Gracia y Ruiz, 2001: 66). That is to say: Francoism and Phalangism were “anti-
nationalist”. 
21. « La guerra, con su luz de fruslería, nos ha abierto los ojos a todos. La idea de turno o juego político ha sido sustituida 
para siempre por la idea de exterminio y de expulsión. » 
22.The most important argument took place in the magazine Historia del Presente, 17 (2011) and 18 (2011), with the 
statements by Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, Gutmaro Gómez Brava and Ismael Saz. Furthermore, González Cuevas 
reviewed Paul Preston’s book at the extreme right-wing and neo-francoist magazine Razón Española (2011b). Other 
remarkable overviews can be found in Reig Tapia (2012) and Sanz, (2011). 
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Franco’s Spain not carried out mass, selective or permanent expulsions of the Basque or Catalan 
population. There was no deportation project in the Franco Spain for creating an ethnically 
homogenous or politically secure state. That, I believe, should be taken into account when so many 
references are made, generally very lightly, about assumptions and theories on genocide and 
extermination projects.23 
Of course, Paul Preston had not written what was attributed to him by the Spanish historian, at least not this 
grotesque description stated by González Cuevas. Preston just tried to explain the main events of Francoist 
occupation in moderate terms, as shared by many other Spanish historians that had investigated this subject. E.g.  
the «arbitrary brutality» (2011: 739) and extreme violence exerted against the Catalan region of Lleida (among 
many victims Preston presents 18 women «two of them pregnant and at least two raped»), «the wild nature» of 
the repression of General Sagardia’s troops in Pallars Sobirà, etc.24 From here on, the British historian just 
documented (by using lots of examples from local history research brilliantly developed in the last decades) 
women’s rape episodes, extrajudicial executions, confiscations, disappearances, etc. He also recalled —and that 
was maybe one of the things that most bothered Pedro C. González Cuevas— the words used by José Artero, 
Canon of the Cathedral of Salamanca, during the Mass to honor Tarragona’s occupation: « ¡Perros catalanes! No 
sois dignos del sol que os alumbra. » [Catalan dogs, you don’t deserve the light of the sun!]. Preston also 
mentioned the main classical Francoist writers, such as Victor Ruíz Albéniz, El Tebib Arrumi, and his well-
known judgment about Catalonia: 
[Catalans] need a biblical punishment (Sodoma, Gomorra) in order to purify their red city, home of 
anarchists and separatists… as the only possible remedy of those two cancers by using an implacable 
method.25  
Nowhere did he consider the violence and repression of the Francoists as genocide or holocaust. On the matter 
of cultural and linguistic repression, he only mentioned the testimony of such a qualified person as the first Civil 
Governor of Barcelona, Wenceslao González Oliveros, showing that there was no tolerance towards 
regionalisms or particular regional identity, because this weakness would provoke, once again, the «same 
putrefaction just removed surgically.26  
Ismael Saz (2011) contested González Cuevas’ manipulative statement, and the spark came from somewhere 
else as well. This is confirming that in 2011 the capacity of understanding of certain Spanish academy was 
beneath acceptable. It is true that González Cuevas is an extreme right-wing political scientist and a radical 
Spanish nationalist, but this is no excuse for the mistake. Jorge Marco did the same when he placed Josep 
Benet’s book in the same basket in which all the reactionary unworthiness of Vicente Cárcel Ortí and the 
obnoxious and demagogical theories of César Vidal were thrown (Marco, 2012: 365, note 6). 
No one seemed to understand that Josep Benet and his followers were referring to the so-called «cultural 
genocide», as a concept that even someone as unfriendly towards Catalan and Catalanist historiography as 
                                                            
23. «Por último, Preston tiende a enfatizar el odio “casi racista” de los franquistas hacia Cataluña. ¿Acaso no hubo 
catalanes en las filas del Ejército Nacional? Sin duda, la prohibición de la lengua catalana en los lugares públicos fue un 
error tanto político como histórico; pero de ahí al exterminio de catalanes por el hecho de serlo hay una distancia sideral. 
Por ello, podemos preguntarnos que si ese odio fue tan fuerte e intenso, ¿por qué la España de Franco no llevó a cabo 
expulsiones masivas, selectivas o permanentes de la población vasca o catalana? No existió en la España de Franco ningún 
proyecto de deportación de pueblos con el objetivos de crear un Estado étnicamente homogéneo o políticamente seguro. 
Esto, creo yo, debería tomarse muy en cuenta cuando se hacen tantas referencias, por lo general a la ligera, sobre supuestos 
afanes o proyectos exterminadores o genocidas.»  
24. General Sagardia’s and the behavior of his troops in the Catalan Pallars region could surely be categorized as «war 
crimes». They followed the same procedures as that of many episodes during the Second World War, mainly in territories 
occupied by the armies of the Fascist Regimes. Gimeno (1989)  synthesizes the episode. It is worth mentioning that this  
General still holds his name in lots of streets and squares and even some villages in Northern Spain.  
25. « un castigo bíblico (Sodoma y Gomorra) para purificar la ciudad roja, la sede del anarquismo y del separatismo…, como 
único remedio para extirpar esos dos cánceres por el termocauterio implacable ».  
26. «España se alzó, con tanta o mayor fiereza, contra los Estatutos desmembradores que contra el comunismo», «mismo 
proceso de putrefacción que acabamos de extirpar quirúrgicamente» [Spain raised in arms, in a strong and fierce way against 
the autonomous Statutes that were tearing Spain apart as well as against Comunism]  La Vanguardia Española, August 5th 
1939 
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Antonio Elorza (2012) defends with remarkable enthusiasm.27 This is the key of a false debate, that has been 
based either on a lie —pretending that the Catalan cultural genocide meant the whole Francoist repression 
extended over the Catalan society— or on ignorance. Very likely, this ignorance is due to not knowing the 
Catalan historical literature concerning these affairs. This is quite possible.28  
It is also true that mistakes made by historians like Albert Balcells help to increase the confusion and disregard 
that Catalan historical research endures. Balcells, without quoting anyone, had stated:  
United Nations defined on December 9th 1948, that Cultural genocide is not only the physical 
extermination of a people but also any other action with the aim to destroy their language, their religion 
and their culture. It consists in forbidding this language in schools and in periodical publications. 
According to this definition, it exactly was an Identity genocide imposed over Catalonia by the Spanish 
Civil War winners. (Balcells, 2012: 83)  
Balcells not only went much further than Josep Benet, but defended an approach that was not true.  All the 
arguments that supposedly sustained this approach were inconsistent. To make matters worse, he invented the 
«identity genocide» concept that does not appear in any other orthodox historical text.  
His mistake was very serious, and over-ruled any subsequent approach. However, it had a positive aspect as it 
kindled the need, the urgent need, to come back to the intellectual sources concerning the issue, and to pull out 
Catalan historical research from the dead end in which it had been trapped. 
2 The original source: Rapahel Lemkin and his impact. 
The primary source is Raphael Lemkin’s work —the jurist of Polish origin who created and defined the term 
genocide in his seminal Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944).29 Lemkin defines the concept as a «new term and 
a new inception to destroy nations»:  
New conceptions require new terms. By "genocide" we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is 
made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in 
its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide 
does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass 
killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the 
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and 
even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national 
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual 
capacity, but as members of the national group. (Lemkin, 1944: 79) 
But Raphael Lemkin said more things, and some of them are extremely useful to define some of the Francoist 
repressive politics conducted in Catalonia. Genocide, he explained, has two phases: the first one is the 
destruction of the national features that an oppressed group has; the second is the imposition of the features of 
the oppressor’s national identity:  
                                                            
27. Indeed, the author defends this concept, but he doesn’t mention any of these cultural genocide’s examples. 
28. In the very long and irregular report at Hispania Nova which has been mentioned so many times. coordinated by Julio 
Aróstegui, Jorge Marco and Gutmaro Gómez Bravo, under the general tittle «De Genocidios, Holocaustos, Exterminios… 
Sobre los procesos represivos en España durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura», there is a remarkable absence in the 
bibliographical and historical mentions about repressive proceedings held in Catalonia, even though a lot of research has 
been made. 
29. Lemkin’s book has been translated into many language, e.g. into French (2008) and Spanish (2009).   
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Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern. The 
author believes, however, that this is inadequate because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the 
biological structure; (2) in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor; and (3) denationalization is used by some authors to 
mean only deprivation of citizenship.  
Many authors, instead of using a generic term, use currently terms connoting only some functional 
aspect of the main generic notion of genocide. Thus, the terms " Germanization," " Magyarization," 
"Italianization," for example, are used to connote the imposition by one stronger nation (Germany, 
Hungary, Italy) of its national pattern upon a national group controlled by it. The author believes that 
these terms are also inadequate because they do not convey the common elements of one generic notion 
and they treat mainly the cultural, economic, and social aspects of genocide, leaving out the biological 
aspect, such as causing the physical decline and even destruction of the population involved. (Lemkin, 
1944:  79-80) 
 
Ultimately, “cultural genocide” would be a partial aspect of an overall reach, the physical destruction of a 
national group (that is to say, a genocide).30 Had Catalan historians who have used this terminology returned to 
the original source, Raphael Lemkin, instead of persistently standing on what he might or might not have said, a 
political and juridical agreement between ideological antagonistic States within United Nations would have 
taken a different and much more interesting path. 
In 1944, Lemkin had no doubt about the political and cultural dimension of genocide’s phenomena. Instead, by 
the time he was defining several genocide techniques he was pointing at some realities not that far from 
Catalonia. In the political sphere, the way he described the consequences of German occupation of Western 
Poland, Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet, as well as Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine, were very similar to ours:  
Every reminder of former national character was obliterated. Even commercial signs and inscriptions 
on buildings, roads, and streets, as well as names of communities and of localities, were changed to a 
German form. Nationals of Luxemburg having foreign or non-German first names are required to 
assume in lieu thereof the corresponding German first names; or, if that is impossible, they must select 
German first names. As to their family names, if they were of German origin and their names have been 
changed to a non-German form, they must be changed again to the original German. (Lemkin, 1944:  
83) 
Lemkin wrote about other strategies which were not implemented in Spain —the occupied territory’s 
colonization by expulsing the native population, for instance—, confiscation of assets and properties to be given 
to the German settlers —as happened, for instance, in Poland—.  Nevertheless, there were enough troubling 
coincidences. On the cultural side:  
(...) the local population is forbidden to use its own language in schools and in printing. According to 
the decree of August 6, 1940, the language of instruction in all Luxemburg schools was made 
exclusively German. The French language was not permitted to be taught in primary schools; only in 
secondary schools could courses in that language continue to be given. German teachers were 
introduced into the schools and they were compelled to teach according to the principles of National. 
(Lemkin, 1944: 85) 
It should be pointed out that in the post-war era in Catalonia, Francoism went a little further than Germans: 
Catalan disappeared from all educational levels, from primary school to university.  
                                                            
30. Jorge Marco (2015) tried to question the analytic working base of Raphael Lemkin —the genocide as a persecution and 
destruction of a national group: destroying its own featuring and defining elements— by making a fake antinationalist 
analysis, crowned by the so well appreciated statement by Spanish nationalist historians —that «all national identities 
belonging to nations, ethnical or racial groups are only “imaginary communities” [Benedict Anderson is the author of this 
expression]». But if you take this as a valid point, why then, in Catalonia, that many people were persecuted for being «rojo-
separatistas» («red-separatists»)? It doesn’t look like Francoists and Phalangists believed very deeply in the «imaginary 
community» concept; that is to say, it seems they considered this community very real, in fact. On the other side, it is also 
true that Marco didn’t know that this «rojo-separatista» criminal category (so to speak) existed. Further on I will get back to 
this point. 
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Cultural activities, in all its expressions, were perfectly controlled by the State: 
In order to prevent the expression of the national spirit through artistic media, a rigid control of all 
cultural activities has been introduced. All persons engaged in painting, drawing, sculpture, music, 
literature, and the theater are required to obtain a license for the continuation of their activities. Control 
in these fields is exercised through German authorities. In Luxemburg this control is exercised through 
the Public Relations Section of the Reich Propaganda Office and embraces music, painting, theater, 
architecture, literature, press, radio, and cinema. Every one of these activities is controlled through a 
special chamber and all these chambers are controlled by one chamber, which is called the Reich 
Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer). The local chambers of culture are presided over by the 
propaganda chief of the National Socialist Party in the given area. Not only have national creative 
activities in the cultural and artistic field been rendered impossible by regimentation, but the population 
has also been deprived of inspiration from the existing cultural and artistic values. (Lemkin, 1944: 84) 
Transfers cannot be automatically made from one to another reality. However, taking into account the early 
period of the Francoist totalitarian behavior, and Nazi-fascists influence on the first cultural activities and 
organizations of the dictatorship —and, at the same time, the forced nationalization they wanted to develop— 
one could think that what was being done in the occupied territories (designed in Berlin) could become an 
interesting reference model for Spain. 
Data provided by Lemkin allows a comparative analysis or, in general, a study of the linguistic and cultural 
repression mechanisms (also probably political) applied to various European regions during the World War II.31 
It would thus be interesting to know how the Italian policies on the French territories, temporary dominated by 
the Italian fascists (Nice, Haute-Savoie, Corsica), or in the Dalmatian coast, performed.32 Indeed, in the 
occupation of Istria, an interesting paradox takes place: the first news about the Italian occupation that reached 
Barcelona when Franco’s regime was at its height were published without problems. Manuel Brunet —a non-
suspicious republican or left-wing journalist— disclosed in a couple of articles in the weekly newspaper Destino 
the Italian’s occupation results in Istria:   
The fascist regime was very hard against the Croatian and Slovenian population in Istria. Their 
language and even their popular songs were forbidden, and a flood of Italian public servants invaded 
the whole Istrian territory, ruling it as a conquered country. […] Under the fascist regime, the change 
was brutal, and non-Istrian Italians felt uncomfortable in their own homes. In some important villages 
there was no governmental authority: the mayor of one of them was a civil servant of the Governor and 
prefect of Fiume, he was a native of Southern Italy and was not precisely known for his administrative 
morality. (Brunet [signing Romano], 1947) 
Manuel Brunet was more specific on another occasion. In a little fishing village called Volosca, next to Abbazia, 
where Francesc Cambó had a residence, in the province of Fiume —which became part of the Yugoslavian 
Republic in 1947, in the Croatian region—:  
In the parochial church from Volosca, a village next to Fiume, we established a relation with a Croatian 
old man with whom we shared a seat on the pew. He was a very distinguished man. […] One day, after 
the dominical mass, he offered us a seat in a bench in the little garden that decorated the high piazza of 
the church. We had never exchanged a single word with him. We were very surprised, that, very 
naturally and without any precaution, he said in a broken Italian: “Isn’t it sad that since Volosca 
belongs to Italy it is forbidden to preach the Gospel in the Croatian language? I feel like a foreigner in 
my church. Isn’t it very sad that in order to sing our inoffensive popular songs we all have to assemble 
in the loneliest country houses in the mountains? I already know you are Spanish33 and that you won’t 
                                                            
31. Spanish historical research interest on Francoism for its repressive practices in the cultural and intellectual spheres, etc, is 
disappointing in general terms, but quite helpful in other most specialized areas (I think of work by professor Fernando 
Larraz and his digital magazine, Represura). But, in the fields of repression and Francoist violence the connection between 
repressive, social and economic politics, and renationalization procedures as well as cultural and linguistic thefts, is almost 
nonexistent, to the extent that a majority of historians refuse or ignore it (or simply because they are Spanish fascists). 
32 A different comparative and in some cases debatable yet interesting approach (perhaps the translation from the original text 
made by the own author contributes to the confusion) can be found in Skerrett (2007). 
33. Taking into account the kind of conversation, it is very possible that this Volosca man considered Manuel Brunet as a 
Catalan. Indeed, Brunet should had censured himself while writing the article. 
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betray me.” The subject of the conversation was always the same when, after coming out of the church 
we used to smoke a cigarette sitting in the little square’s bench. And it wasn’t easy to make him change 
the subject, talking about the rain season or the Adriatic Sea travels. Perhaps, if our pew’s neighbor is 
still alive, he is now persecuted for his fervent Catholicism or for owning some land in his beloved 
Istrian coast. It is also possible that this Croatian patriot was killed under the Croatian government rule. 
Because, fascist or communist, totalitarian states have to infringe, one way or another, the natural laws 
of freedom, and they must base their  success on the triumph of hatred and practicing power over the 
law.»34 (Brunet [Romano], 1945)  
An attempt to make a comparative analysis should acknowledge the fundamental idea that temporary contexts, 
historical circumstances or basic policies —mainly the racist ones, which led to the displacements of the 
population, the violent «Germanisation» that Rapahel Lemkin spoke of, etc.—  are not automatically comparable 
to States and societies as different as the Italian, German and Spanish ones. This premise cannot be challenged, 
but it forecloses a descriptive approach to different repression levels of the nationalization processes, such as the 
Slovenian, the Alsatian or the Catalan ones, who suffered from different degrees of repression and violent 
policies, politically, culturally and linguistic. 
Looking at the geography of repression in occupied territories —and, in this sense, Catalonia was militarily 
occupied, the same way as Alsace, Slovenia and the French Savoy, we need only to read the fascist texts of the 
time—, we realize that fascist regimes shared many basic, elemental mechanisms. In a second phase, Italians 
and Germans developed racist and/or exterminatory policies that, in the Spanish case —fortunately—, were not 
applied.  But, as a matter of fact, some of the geographical, ethnical, historical and social practices implemented 
in those territories were exchangeable. In Alsace —as Rapaheal Lemkin stated in 1944—, the Germanisation of 
names and surnames —in Spanish paradoxically family names had not been questioned—,  commercial trading 
names and shops, were implemented very fast and in a very brutal way (Verneret, 2011). Indeed, the Nazi 
occupation was extraordinarily tough: speaking French in public could be punished with temporary detention; 
civil servants were obligated to sign a loyalty statement to the Reich and to Adolf Hitler —something very 
similar happened in Spain, where university professors had to swear allegiance to the «Movement principles» 
(Principios del Movimiento) etc. In other occupied areas, procedures were very similar across all fascist 
European countries:       
The associative fabric has almost all been replaced by the satellite organizations of the NSDAP, which 
cultivated the taste of the uniform of the Nazi symbolism. From school to businesses and even to 
leisure organizations for women, children, seniors, etc., the regime marks its presence by the Nazi 
symbolism and the will of a complete indoctrination of society.  (Verneret, 2011)   
Most probably, without the efficiency and the visual power that Nazi organizations projected, we must 
remember the Franco-phalangist efforts to frame Spanish society within the Sección Femenina (Female Section), 
el Frente de Juventudes (the Youth Front), etc. 
And what about the areas under Italian fascist control? If we assume that renationalization procedures were a 
common practice of the European fascist policies —for instance, Germany, Italy and Spain in 1939—, it is not 
                                                            
34. «En la iglesia parroquial de Volosca, población situada cerca de Fiume, llegamos a trabar relación con un croata ya 
anciano con quien ocupábamos un extremo del mismo banco. Era un hombre muy distinguido. […] Un día a la salida del 
oficio dominical, nos ofreció un puesto en un banco del pequeño jardín que decoraba la elevada plazoleta de la iglesia. 
Nunca habíamos cambiado con él una sola palabra. Es por esto que nos sorprendió en gran manera que con la mayor 
naturalidad del mundo, y sin precaución de ninguna clase empezara diciendo en un pésimo italiano: ‘¿No es triste que desde 
que Volosca es italiana esté prohibido predicar el Evangelio en lengua croata? Me siento forastero en mi iglesia. ¿Y no es 
también muy triste que para cantar nuestras inofensivas canciones populares tengamos que reunirnos en las casas de campo 
más solitarias de la montaña? Ya sé que usted es español y que no ha de traicionarme’. El tema de conversación fue siempre 
el mismo cada vez que al salir de la iglesia fumábamos un cigarrillo sentado en el banco de la plazoleta. Y no era fácil 
hacerle cambiar de tema hablándole de la proximidad del período de lluvias o de viajes por el Adriático. Tal vez, si es que 
nuestro vecino del banco de la iglesia de Volosca vive aún, ha sigo perseguido ahora por el delito de ser un ferviente 
católico o de poseer unas tierras en aquel levante istriano que él tanto amaba. Y es probable que ese venerable patriota 
corata haya sido asesinado al ser gobernado por croatas. Porque, fascista o comunista, el Estado totalitario ha de 
conculcar una u otra, o todas las libertades del derecho natural y basar sus éxitos en el triunfo del odio y de la fuerza sobre 
el derecho» 
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surprising that the Italian management of Slovenia —or regions such as Venezia Giulia or the Alto Adige— was 
based on repressive and supplanted mechanisms very similar to the ones used in Alsace and Catalonia. Indeed, 
neither the chronology nor the historical context —the Second World War with all its complexity among all 
these Balkan and bordering regions: double military occupation, first Italian, then German; the extremist-racist 
policies; the enforced movements of population, etc.— allow us to make a static and mechanic comparison. But 
when we read the board that the fascists of Dignano—in the Udine’s province, in Friül— made and hanged on 
the façades of houses, we may recognize the familiar air of Italian fascists nationalization policies: 
N.F.-Squadristi-Dignano Command 
Warning! 
It is absolutely forbidden to speak in Slavic language in public gatherings, in the streets of Dignano and 
in stores of any kind. 
ONLY ITALIAN LANGUAGE 
We Squadrists, with persuasive methods, will make this order be complied. 
THE QUARTERS 
In the years that Slovenia was under Italian fascist domination, the repressive policies of nationalization 
followed well-known patterns; the non-Italian written media were closed (as well as radio stations): the 
Slovenian language was forbidden in the educational system; all the names of villages, streets, routes were 
Italianized, as well as the names, surnames and commercial trading names and brands, etc. These kind of actions 
were also implemented in Venezia Giulia and in the Alto Adige, with the active participation and enthusiasm of 
local and regional fascists, who combined the Italian nationalist speech with anticommunist and antidemocratic 
claims (Premik, 2004). Krožek Premik describes a more general and more extensive program of re-
nationalization, with destitution of civil servants —in an extraordinarily more radical depuration and expulsion 
process than in the case of Spain—, attempts of agrarian colonization with people from southern Italy, etc., The  
repressive model resembles much more the project of conquest and construction of the Nazi lebensraum than the 
idea of the «Cataluña recuperada para España» of the Franco-phalangists. 
On the eastern border of Italy, in the French Savoy, the occupation and the fascist-nationalization combination 
worked quite similarly. Nice was submitted to «an intense fascist propaganda aimed at promoting 
Italianization»: «It is not merely the urban views which are modified by changes in the names of streets, the 
signs of the shops, or even the signaling, but also the very culture». In Menton, «Italianization is accompanied 
by the fascistization of the city» (Grillève, 2012: 253-54). 
Indeed, the modification of the urban space —for example, with the intervention on street names, or the 
imposition of language in posters, indicators, etc.— is one of the most obvious samples of these forced processes 
of renationalization that European fascisms imposed. In the Spanish case, the note published by Wenceslao 
González Oliveros, Civil Governor of Barcelona, on the liquidation of signage in Catalan language, belonged  to 
a program of ferocious renationalization, as remarkable as the one carried out by Nazis and Italian fascists in 
their occupied territories. Furthermore, in the Catalan case, the change of language not only affected the public 
space, but also reached the private sphere, as can be read at the end of the governor's decree: 
Barcelona and its province have to offer their residents and visitors, national and foreigners, the 
appearance of a land as fully Spanish as it was in times of its most glorious tradition, when the 
monarchs, immortal founders of the Spanish Empire, were as pleased to reside in this city as in their 
own headquarters. I have arranged to grant a term that will end on the 15th of the current month of 
September so that the remains of red-separatist inscriptions disappear and be replaced by texts correctly 
drafted in the national language. Those that still appear in any other language, in facades, commercial 
samples, documents used in relation to the public, inscriptions and signs, as well as all kinds of 
writings, announcements and documents of public and private entities, associations and foundations of 
any kind and, obviously, those that belong to public services without exception, both in the capital and 
in the province.  [Solidaridad Nacional, September 5th 1939] 
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As already stated, the lowest common denominator of repression remained, and this allows us to link most of the 
repressive practices carried out in three regions as different Alsace, Slovenia and Catalonia, designed and 
executed within the frame of the renationalization process of the main European fascisms. From 1943, with 
Benito Mussolini’s fall and Fascism in retreat, Germany took control over these regions —in some of them, such 
as Slovenia or Istria, the violence of war and the cruel combats against the partisans, had radicalized even more 
the repressive policies— and the repressive nationalization practice made both a brutal qualitative and 
quantitative leap. But in a new complex and violent reality, some events happened —at least in the cultural-
symbolic arena— that were not very far from the Catalan situation of the early forties. For example, the impulse 
that the German propaganda apparatus gave to the «trestinismo» —the « richiamo al patriottismo locale »— 
(Colloti, 2002: 195) that referred to Trieste’s recoverable past —before 1919—. It reminds us of the 
«Barcelonism» —the invention of a past that is kind and friendly, almost idyllic, limited to the city of 
Barcelona— that local Francoist media, such as Destino. Política de Unidad as well as Diario de Barcelona, 
continually used against national identities, the local “invented community” (Cassany, 2011: 13-26). 
Nevertheless, the three European fascisms failed in their renationalization programs. In the Venezia Giulia’s 
Italian case, Krozek Primek asserted with severity that it was a « real program for the integral destruction of the 
national Slovenian and Croatian identity. The outcome was nevertheless quite modest, not for unwillingness, but 
because of lack of resources which in this one, such as in other fields, rendered unrealistic the totalitarian 
aspirations of the regime» (Premik, 2004).  In the Spanish case, despite lasting longer, in 1945, before the end of 
the decade, Franco-phalangist most ambitious project had already failed. 
3 The "rojo-separatista" enemy and the genocidal language. 
It is possible to find a common minimum denominator across the repressive policies of European Fascists States 
addressed to fight on the one side social class, ideological or national enemies (communists, democrats, 
socialists, etc) and, on the other side, for instance, Slovenians, Alsatians or Catalans. One key of this common 
minimum denominator is the radical nationalism that impregnated these fascisms, and that, in the German case, 
moves towards extreme racist and exterminating policies. Indeed, Francoism —tied to a fierce Spanish 
nationalism— did not take things as far as German nationalists did; there was no extermination practice or 
collective deportation orders, as it happened in the European regions occupied by the Nazis and the Italian 
fascists even before the beginning of the war in September 1939. Yet, this fact —which can be explained by 
many different reasons, starting with very different historical and temporary contexts— did not prevent the 
construction of the image of the enemy and the spreading of an extremely violent discourse against this enemy, 
who had to be fought and destroyed, not only physically, but morally, culturally and professionally.  
Many Spanish historians have tried to define this enemy, this obstacle to the radical renationalization process 
that the lethal combination of Spanish fascism and religious and cultural fanaticism fostered, but have never 
tuned enough. For instance, in an insufficient and clearly partial analysis, Jorge Marco (2015b) only found the 
«rojo» (red) as the true «inner enemy» of Spanish fascism:35  
Rojo was in fact everyone who contravened, with actions and identities, what the rebels defined as the 
“natural order” of Spanish society, to the point of being qualified as the denial of the Nation: the anti-
Spain. The Rojos were attributed with cultural elements, linked to foreign fashion and political 
ideologies, from socialism to liberalism, and all the progressive isms of their time. (Souza, 1947b)36 
                                                            
35.  Cfr. also Sevillano Calero (2010) and Àngel Duarte (2010). They very astonishingly forget the «rojo-separatista» issue in 
their links between enemies of the Spanish fascist-nationalists.  
36. «Rojo era todo aquel que contravenía con sus prácticas e identidades aquello que los rebeldes consideraban el “orden 
natural” de la sociedad española, hasta el punto de ser calificados como la negación de la nación: la Anti-España. Al rojo 
se le atribuían elementos de tipo cultural, vinculados a modas e ideologías extranjeras, desde el socialismo al liberalismo, 
pasando por la multiplicidad de ismos progresistas de la época.» 
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Nevertheless, the enemy was not only «rojo»: it was not even the most important or the most dangerous. To 
understand the depth of the Spanish fascist violence —during the war and afterwards— it is indispensable to 
identify the absolute, total enemy: the «rojo-separatista», not only «rojo» but «rojo-separatista». 
It is necessary to not make the mistake —common in Spanish historical research— of thinking that the «rojo-
separatista» enemy was a category designed only for Catalanist and Basque nationalists. When the Phalangists 
from Donostia thought of the «rojo-separatista revolution», which was «more cruel and stupid than any of the 
precedent liberal and communist revolutions» (Souza, 1937c), they were not referring to the independentist or 
anarchist claims from Barcelona or Bilbao. They were referring to «the savagery of the rojo-separatist leaders, 
especially the ones in Madrid», responsible for the destruction of the artistic heritage in the Republican area. 
Was there any «rojo-separatista» leader in Madrid in 1937? 
The enemy to be destroyed —responsible for the “martyrdom” of so many Phalangists, «that is expecting the 
exemplary vengeance that we must pay in their tribute»— (Souza, 1937c) were the «rojo-separatistas», a 
category whose main creator, Maximiano García Venero (Tresgallo de Souza for the glory of the Phalangist 
letters), made perfectly clear:  
We were pleased with the name “reds” which was applied benignly to the components and defenders of 
the Popular Front. “Reds” are the Anarchists and the Marxists and even their Republican auxiliaries. 
But among the factors of the tragic war of these months, the separatists have as much responsibility as 
the “reds”.  
The separatists, aided by the federalist and autonomist republicans, made possible the triumph of 
Marxism and Anarchism. It was the separatists who gave way to the unpatriotic current, which flowed 
from the decades of parliamentary liberalism. It was necessary that people did not forget the 
participation of the separatists in the agony of the Spanish essence, culminated in the five years of the 
Republic. We then gave existence to the word "red-separatist". This entails the rejection and 
condemnation of the Marxist and Anarchist bandits and the Catalan separatists. This word contained the 
rejection and the damnation of Marxists and anarchist bandits and of Catalan separatists.» (Souza, 
1937c) 
Here is the enemy! the «radical problem», that Víctor d’Ors (son of Eugeni d’Ors, the «Xenius» of early cultural 
Catalanism), wrote referring only to a part of the «rojo-separatista» combination:37 
This is a radical problem —from its roots— that must be radically solved. And there is no middle 
ground. We must not say: "political autonomy, no; administrative, yes "; or else "official language, no, 
family language, yes". All of these are blunders. There is no Administration without politics, nor 
familiar language which cannot become, and must become, indeed, a language of culture. And why 
shouldn’t a language of culture have its official consecration? No. We are going to build the New Spain 
with unsurpassed solidity. And so we say once and for all: any element of differentiation that can 
irremediably separate Spaniards morally or materially from each another, must be avoided and, if 
necessary, annihilated.38 
Not much has been said in Spanish historical research on the importance of genocide language; and it is perhaps 
necessary to start analyzing it with attention. We constantly read statements such as the following ones: (i) the 
war imposed the idea of «expulsion and extermination» (José M. Pemán); (ii)  the well-known «¡Catalan dogs! 
You don’t deserve the light of the sun», from the Canon José Artero; (iii) the «biblical punishment, the 
implacable “termocauterio” (destruction)» (Víctor Ruíz Albéniz); (iv) the «process of putrefaction that we just 
retired surgically» (Wenceslao González Oliveros); (v) the «separatism infamous and parricide» (Cuadrado); 
(vi) «the unforgivable crime that is separatism» (Antonio Nero Campelo); (vii) the reconstruction of Spanish 
                                                            
37. As quoted by Riquer (2010: 62). The citation comes from V. Ors (1937) in Proyección mundial del nacionalsindicalismo. 
La reconstrucción de España (1). It is also mentioned by Núnez Seixas (2006: 313-314).  
38 «Esto es un problema radical – de raíz – que radicalmente debe ser resuelto. Y no caben términos medios. No vale decir: 
“autonomía política, no; administrativa sí”; o bien: “lengua oficial, no, Lengua de familia, sí”. Todo esto son torpezas. No 
hay Administración sin política, ni lenguaje familiar que no se pueda, y se convierta en efecto, en lengua de cultura. Y una 
lengua de cultura ¿por qué no ha de tener consagración oficial? No. Vamos a construir la nueva España con solidez sin 
igual. Y por ello decimos una vez para todas: todo elemento de diferenciación que pueda irremediablemente separar moral o 
materialmente a los españoles, deber ser evitado y, si es preciso, aniquilado”.  
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national unity is «restored with blood and fire»; (viii) the invocations to «our permanent violence» against 
separatism and the reminder that «it is not possible to feel pity for separatists. It is the black beast of the Spanish 
tragedy» or «the exemplar vengeance we must render» the Phalangist martyrs (Maximiano García Venero); (ix) 
the warming that «we do not only fight to exterminate Marxism and Freemasonry from our ground, but also for 
the unity and the elevation of Spain itself» (Luis Hurtado Álvarez); (x) the good news such as «criminal 
separatism has been exterminated» (El Heraldo de Aragón, 15th February 1939); (xi) the «final and irrevocable 
account clearance» (José M. del Moral); (xii) the ineludible Queipo de Llano stating: «Phalangists will end with 
this plague of nationalists, who are no other than bandits, murderers and non-patriots, and we won’t stop until 
we will see them dragged by a horse or rotting in jail»; (xii) the famous Francisco de Cossío pointing out that 
«the stigma of betrayal» of the (Catalan and Basque) separatists «remains sealed by the overpowering violence 
of conquest».39 These are expressions that should facilitate the reflection of Spanish historical research on these 
subjects.  
Also, Spanish experts in repression and violence procedures could pause and read Professor Xosé M. Núñez-
Seixas’ opinion about this issue: «For the group of socio-political sectors identified with the rebels, the 
nationalist discourse was revealed from the beginning as its most efficient mobilizing instrument, as well as its 
most widespread mobilizing instrument» (2006: 180).40 And, thus, the «mobilizing instrument» would be the 
previous step to the gestation of the «true extermination language» (Ternon, 1995: 97) which, luckily for the 
Catalans, was only specified with some legal prohibition measures, which were carried with a severity worthy of 
the Spanish national cause, but that didn’t lead to the physical destruction of the national group (who is the one 
that establishes the official definition of genocide). Further on, by the way, Yves Ternon makes a warning I have 
never seen a comment in the debates on these questions in Spain: «The verbal aggression sounds the alarm. The 
use of certain words, of certain formulas, the creation of certain associations of ideas, are already the instruments 
of a criminal practice» (ibid.).  
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